IPv6 Network Reconnaissance:
Theory & Practice

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About...

- I have worked in security assessment of communication protocols for:
  - UK NISCC (National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre)
  - UK CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure)
- Currently working as a security researcher for SI6 Networks (http://www.si6networks.com)
- Active participant at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
- More information at: http://www.gont.com.ar

Introduction

- IPv6 changes the “Network Reconnaissance” game
- Brute force address scanning attacks undesirable (if at all possible)
- Security guys need to evolve in how they do net reconnaissance
  - Pentests/audits
  - Deliberate attacks
- Network reconnaissance support in security tools has been **very poor**

IPv6 Network Reconnaissance

- Address scans
- DNS-based (AXFR, reverse mappings, etc.)
- Application-based
- Inspection of local data structures (NC, routing table, etc.)
- Inspection of system configuration and log files
- “Snooping” routing protocols
- draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning is your friend :-)

IPv6 Address Scanning

What we did

- We researched the problem
- We worked on a comprehensive IPv6 Address Scanner
- We used our toolkit on the public Internet, to:
  - Test the effectiveness of our techniques (theory -> practice)
  - Gain further insights (practice -> theory)

IPv6 Address Scanning
Local Networks

Overview

- Leverage IPv6 all-nodes link-local multicast address
- Employ multiple probe types:
  - Normal multicasted ICMPv6 echo requests (don't work for Windows)
  - Unrecognized options of type 10xxxxxx
- Combine learned IIDs with known prefixes to learn all addresses
- Example:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -L
```

IPv6 Address Scanning
Remote Networks

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Overview

- IPv6 address-scanning attacks have long been considered unfeasible
- This myth has been based on the assumption that:
  - IPv6 subnets are /64s, **and**,
  - Host addresses are “randomly” selected from that /64
- Existing research suggests this is not the case

Malone, D., "Observations of IPv6 Addresses", Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM 2008, LNCS 4979), April 2008, <http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/addr-pam08.pdf>.

IPv6 addresses in the real world

- Malone measured (*) the address generation policy of hosts and routers in real networks

Address type	Percentage
SLAAC	50%
IPv4-based	20%
Teredo	10%
Low-byte	8%
Privacy	6%
Wordy	<1%
Others	<1%

Hosts

Address type	Percentage
Low-byte	70%
IPv4-based	5%
SLAAC	1%
Wordy	<1%
Privacy	<1%
Teredo	<1%
Others	<1%

Routers

Malone, D., "Observations of IPv6 Addresses", Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM 2008, LNCS 4979), April 2008, <http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwmalone/p/addr-pam08.pdf>.

IPv6 addresses embedding IEEE IDs



- In practice, the search space is at most ~2^{23} bits – **feasible!**
- Example:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -K 'Dell Inc' -v
```

IPv6 addresses embedding IEEE IDs (II)

- Virtualization technologies present an interesting case
- Virtual Box employs OUI 08:00:27 (search space: ~2^{23})
- VMWare ESX employs:
  - Automatic MACs: OUI 00:05:59, and next 16 bits copied from the low order 16 bits of the host's IPv4 address (search space: ~2^{8})
  - Manually-configured MACs:OUI 00:50:56 and the rest in the range 0x000000-0x3fffff (search space: ~2^{22})
- Examples:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -V vbox

# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -V vmware -Q 10.10.0.0/8
```

IPv6 addresses embedding IPv4 addr.

- They simply embed an IPv4 address in the IID
- Two variants found in the wild:
  - 2000:db8::192.168.0.1 <- Embedded in 32 bits
  - 2000:db8::192:168:0:1 <- Embeded in 64 bits
- Search space: same as the IPv4 search space – feasible!
- Examples:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -Q 10.10.0.0/8
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -Q 10.10.0.0/8
```

IPv6 addresses embedding service ports

- They simply embed the service port the IID
- Two variants found in the wild:
  - 2001:db8::1:80 <- n:port
  - 2001:db8::80:1 <- port:n
- Additionally, the service port can be encoded in hex vs. dec
  - 2001:db8::80 vs. 2001:db8::50
- Search space: smaller than 2^8 – feasible!
- Example:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 -g
```

IPv6 “low-byte” addresses

- The IID is set to all-zeros, “except for the last byte”
  - e.g.: 2000:db8::1
- Other variants have been found in the wild:
  - 2001:db8::n1:n2 <- where n1 is typically greater than n2
- Search space: usually 2^8 or 2^{16} – feasible!
- Example:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00::/64 --tgt-low-byte
```

IPv6 host-tracking

- SLAAC typically leads to IIDs that are constant across networks
- Sample scenario:
  - Node is known to have the IID **1:2:3:4**
  - To check whether the node is at fc00:1::/64 or fc00:2::/64:
  - ping fc00:1::**1:2:3:4** and fc00:2::**1:2:3:4**
- Examples:

```
# scan6 -i eth0 -d fc00:1::/64 -d fc00:2::/64
-W ::1:2:3:4

# scan6 -i eth0 -m prefs.txt -w iids.txt -l -z 60 -t -v
```

IPv6 Address Scanning
Advanced topics

Packet-loss detection/recovery (TODO)

- Possible causes of packet-loss:
  - Network congestion
  - Rate-limits
  - Neighbor Cache exhaustion
- Address-scanning is essentially an open-loop!
- Workaround:
  - Obtain the last hop to a target-network
  - Probe that router periodically
  - Back-off and rewind upon packet loss

Automated heuristic scanner (TODO)

- Allow scan6 to receive IPv6 addresses known to be “alive”
- Identify the IPv6 address/IID type
- Compute new target ranges
  - “New” targets are ignored if redundant
  - Targets are coalesced with other targets if appropriate
- Different patterns -> different priorities - based on sizeof(search space)
- Example:

```
# cat sources | scan6 -i eth0 -c -v
```

IPv6 Address Scanning
Real-world data

Our experiment

- Find “a considerable number of IPv6 nodes” for address analysis:
  - Alexa Top-1M sites + perl script + dig
  - World IPv6 Launch Day site + perl script + dig
- For each domain:
  - AAAA records
  - NS records -> AAAA records
  - MX records -> AAAA records
- What did we find?

IPv6 address distribution for the web



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IPv6 address distribution for MXs



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IPv6 address distribution for the DNS



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Mat Ford's measurements

- Analysis of client IPv6 addresses from web-server log:



Further measurements (TODO)

- Evaluate the reliability of different probe packets
  - Is IPv6 fragment filtering that bad?
  - How about other IPv6 extension headers?
  - How about rate limiting of ICMPv6 vs. other probe packets
- Finally, evaluate IPv6 packet-filtering practices
  - Same as for IPv4?

DNS-based IPv6 Network Reconnaissance

DNS for Network Reconnaissance

- Most of this ground is well-known from the IPv4-world:
  - DNS zone transfers
  - DNS bruteforcing
  - etc.
- DNS reverse-mappings particularly useful for “address scanning”

IPv6 DNS reverse mappings



- Technique:
  - Given a zone X.ip6.arpa., try the labels [0-f].X.ip6.arpa.
  - If an NXDOMAIN is received, that part of the “tree” should be ignored
  - Otherwise, if NOERROR is received, “walk” that part of the tree
- Example (using dnsrevenum6 from THC-IPv6):

```
$ dnsrevenum6 DNSSERVER IPV6PREFIX
```

Aplication-based IPv6 Network Reconnaissance

Application-based Network Recon

- Many application-layer protocol deal with domain-names or IPv6 addresses.
- Some applications even leave publicly trails of data exchanges
- Examples:
  - P2P aplications
  - email
  - etc.

Application-based Network Recon (II)

- Sample email header:

```
X-ClientAddr: 46.21.160.232
Received: from srv01.bbserve.nl (srv01.bbserve.nl [46.21.160.232])
       by venus.xmundo.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id p93Ar0E4003196
       for <fernando@gont.com.ar>; Mon, 3 Oct 2011 07:53:01 -0300
Received: from [2001:5c0:1000:a::943]
       by srv01.bbserve.nl with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256)
       (Exim 4.76)
       (envelope-from <fgont@si6networks.com>)
       id 1RAg8k-0000Qf-Hu; Mon, 03 Oct 2011 12:52:55 +0200
Message-ID: <4E8993FC.30600@si6networks.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Oct 2011 07:52:44 -0300
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Organization: SI6 Networks
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23)
Gecko/20110922 Thunderbird/3.1.15
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Subject: Prueba
```

Inspection of local data structures

Inspection of local data structures

- Local data structures store valuable network information:
  - IPv6 addresses of local nodes
  - IPv6 addresses of “known” nodes
  - Routing information
  - etc
- loopback6 (upcoming) aims at collecting such information from the local nod
- Example:

```
# loopback6 --all
```

Inspection of system configuration & log files

System configuration and log files

- Yet another source of possibly interesting names/addresses
- Trivial approach:
  - Walk the tree and look virtually everywhere
- Improved approach:
  - Look at interesting places depending on the local operating system
- audit6 (upcoming) aims at collecting such information from the local system
- Example:

```
# audit6 --all
```

Snooping routing protocols

System configuration and log files

- Some sites employ interior routing protocols (RIP, OSPF, etc.)
- Snooping/participating in the protocol can provide useful info
  - Internal subnets
  - Internal routers

Conclusions

Conclusions

- IPv6 changes the “Network Reconnaissance” game
- Smart address scanning is feasible
- A number of techniques still need to be explored
- Stay tuned to further developments in this area :-)

Thanks!

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